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Abstract
We examine the long-run performance and valuation of IPOs underwritten by relation-
ship banks. We ¯nd that over one- to three-year horizons these IPOs do not underperform
similar stocks managed by independent institutions. Moreover, our analysis suggests that
relationship banks avoid potential con°icts of interest by choosing to underwrite their
best clients' IPOs. Consistent with this result, we show that investors value new issues
managed by relationship banks higher than similar IPOs managed by outside banks. Our
¯ndings support the certi¯cation role of relationship banks and suggest that the e®ect of
the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act has not been negative.1
1 Introduction
There has been an extensive debate in the United States regarding the costs and bene¯ts of
participation by commercial banks in the securities underwriting business. When banks lend
to ¯rms they acquire proprietary ¯rm-speci¯c information about their clients (e.g., Diamond
(1991), Rajan (1992), and Stein (2002)). A more informed bank can e®ectively certify a ¯rm's
value and facilitate the underwriting of its client's securities, especially IPOs. However, a
lending bank's informational advantage presents a con°ict of interest since a bank that has
a stake in a ¯rm has incentives to promote the overpriced issuance of a junior claim. This
paper adds to the debate along two dimensions. First, we study the long-run performance of
IPOs underwritten by commercial banks. We ¯nd that over one- to three-year horizons these
IPOs do not underperform similar stocks managed by independent underwriters. Second, we
examine the selection of IPOs that go public with their relationship bank. Our results suggest
that relationship banks avoid potential con°icts of interest by choosing to underwrite their
best clients' IPOs. Consistent with this conclusion, we show that investors value new issues
managed by relationship banks higher than similar IPOs managed by outside banks.
The 1933 Glass-Steagall Act addressed the potential con°ict of interest by banning com-
mercial banks from the market for corporate securities underwriting (Sections 20 and 32 of the
Act). Over the past two decades this restriction has been relaxed. The deregulation process
begun in 1987 when regulators reinterpreted Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed
some banks, such as JP Morgan and Bankers Trust, to set up Section 20 subsidiaries which
can underwrite corporate securities (e.g., Puri (1999)). This process culminated in the 1999
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, which brought down the `¯rewalls' that
limited information, resource, and ¯nancial linkages between Section 20 subsidiaries and their
parent holding companies as well as with their commercial banking a±liates.
Motivated by these policy developments previous studies have investigated the con°ict-
of-interest and certi¯cation debate by examining the underwriting of bonds. For instance,
Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1994, 1996) provide evidence based on bond issues under-
written prior to the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act. Gande et al. (1997) use data on bond
issues from January 1993 to March 1995. Consistent with the certi¯cation view, Puri (1996)
and Gande et al. (1997) ¯nd that debt issues managed by commercial banks exhibit relatively
higher prices, and further, Puri (1994) shows that bank underwritten issues defaulted less than
non-bank underwritten issues. Also consistent with the certi¯cation role of banks, Kroszner
and Rajan (1994) ¯nd that bond issues underwritten by commercial banks had default rates
lower than similar issues managed by investment banks.
Here we consider a new sample, IPOs underwritten by the ¯rm's commercial bank during2
the period from 1998 to 2000, and present additional evidence that helps understand the con-
sequences of bringing down the commercial-investment bank ¯rewalls. By combining di®erent
data sources, we identify the ¯rm's pre-IPO bank (referred to as the `relationship bank' in this
article), the IPO underwriters, and the ¯rm's characteristics. As such, we can precisely identify
the IPOs that were underwritten by a bank subject to a potential con°ict of interest.
We focus on two sets of tests. First, we study whether IPOs underwritten by relationship
banks exhibit abnormal long-run returns compared to equity issues underwritten by indepen-
dent banks. This analysis adds to Schenone (2004) who focuses on the short-run performance
of IPOs that had a relationship with a prospective underwriter. Second, we examine the se-
lection of IPOs that go public with their relationship banks. In particular, we study whether
relationship banks avoid underwriting the IPOs of their low-value clients, which are typically
higher-risk IPOs that could expose the bank to a con°ict of interest. This work also adds to
Schenone (2004), who studies IPO valuation but does not examine the selection of ¯rms that
go public with their bank.
The ¯rst part of our long-run performance study focuses on the cross-section of buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs). We start out by computing mean BHARs, with holding
periods from one to three years, for stocks managed by a relationship bank. For each of these
IPOs we identify a matching stock which has similar risk characteristics but was managed by
an independent underwriter. We do not ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in performance between the
returns on the two samples of stocks. This result is robust across the di®erent benchmarks that
we use to compute abnormal returns and across holding periods.
Fama (1998) warns that the results of a long-run performance study based on buy-and-
hold abnormal returns should be interpreted with caution. Concerns arise from systematic
errors due to imperfect expected return proxies (the `bad-model' problem), the skewness of
individual-¯rm long-horizon BHARs, and the cross-sectional correlation of BHARs that overlap
in calendar time. We attempt to address these issues. To limit the bad model problem, we
consider benchmark portfolios that are similar to the IPO stocks on characteristics known to
be related to average returns. We focus on portfolios of stocks ranked by size and book-to-
market, but we also examine industry-ranked portfolios and di®erent market indeces (S&P 500,
Nasdaq, as well as NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks). Further, we consider a logarithmic
transformation of the BHAR variable to address the asymmetry problem. More importantly, to
deal with calendar-time dependence we estimate the cross-sectional correlations of the BHARs
with daily returns data, and we use these estimates to conduct inference. We reach the same
conclusion that the two samples of IPOs performed similarly, except for some evidence that
IPOs underwritten by relationship banks in year 1999 did better at the one-year horizon.
Although we attempt to eliminate the e®ect of cross-sectional correlation there could be3
legitimate concerns that our approach to do so may still be inadequate. As such, in the
second part of our long-run analysis we follow a calendar-time approach (e.g., Fama (1998)).
Speci¯cally, we consider a zero-cost investment strategy that entails a long position in the
IPOs underwritten by relationship banks and a short position in ex-ante similar stocks that
have been taken public by an outside bank. We compute equal- and value-weighted returns on
such portfolio with holding periods of one, two, and three years. We test the performance of
this strategy using a linear model which includes a market factor, the Fama and French (1993)
HML and SMB factors, and a momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart
(1997)). We still reach the conclusion that IPOs underwritten by relationship banks do not
underperform the stocks in the control sample.
Finally, in the last part of the paper we investigate whether there is self-selection among the
¯rms that go public with their relationship bank. Self-selection could arise because relationship
banks might shy away from underwriting the IPOs of their low-value clients, which are typically
higher risk IPOs that could expose the bank to a con°ict of interest. This e®ect is further
reinforced because high-value ¯rms might have an incentive to go public with their bank, which
is in a position to certify the true worth of their stock. When certi¯cation prevails over con°icts
of interest, the e®ect of such selection is that the average market value of the ¯rms underwritten
by relationship banks is no lower than that of ¯rms taken public by independent banks. We
consider a model that accounts for ¯rm-bank selection and we study ¯rm valuation. We ¯nd
that the outcome of going public with a relationship bank is not random. Further, we show
that the value of ¯rms that go public with their bank is higher than the value of ¯rms that go
public with an outside institution. These results point towards the certi¯cation hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how we construct
the data set and the relevant variables while Section 3 contains the analysis. Section 4 addresses
the interpretation of our results and concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Sample selection
Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act were o±cially repealed on November 12, 1999 with
the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. However, the move towards universal banking
started in 1987 (see Puri (1999)) when the Federal Reserve Board granted permission to three
banks to underwrite and deal in tier-one securities, i.e., municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-
backed securities, commercial paper, and consumer-receivables-related securities. In 1989, the
Board expanded the underwriting powers of ¯ve commercial banks to include tier-two securities,4
i.e., corporate debt and equity. Subsequently, and on a case-by-case basis, the Federal Reserve
granted commercial banks permission to establish `Section 20 subsidiaries,' which could engage
in those underwriting activities that Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act considered ineligible.
Still, these subsidiaries were subject to various ¯rewalls that limited the °ow of information,
resources, and revenues between the subsidiary and the parent bank's holding company, as well
as with the commercial bank a±liate.
These ¯rewalls began to tumble in the late 1990s. For example, at the end of 1996 the Federal
Reserve substantially increased the revenue cap on Section 20 subsidiaries and dropped many
of the ¯rewalls that limited information °ows. Before 1998, the activity of commercial banks
and their Section 20 subsidiaries in underwriting equity issues was very limited. Gande, Puri,
and Saunders (1999) compute the share of the annual dollar volume and number of U.S. equity
issues underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial bank holding companies, and
conclude that \to date, commercial banks have made little inroads into the equity underwriting
market." Hence, our sample of IPO ¯rms begins on January 1, 1998, when enough IPOs were
underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries to validate empirical analysis.
Our sample period ends on December 31, 2000. Firms that went public between 1998
and 2000 established their pre-IPO banking relationships without knowing that the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act would have opened the way to IPO underwriting
by commercial banks. As such, there is no self-selection of a pre-IPO lender in our sample, a
result that is consistent with the ¯ndings of Schenone (2004). However, after year 2000 ¯rms
are likely to strategically choose a pre-IPO banking relationship with a potential underwriter
(see, e.g., Drucker (2005) for related evidence), which would create a bias in the results due to
the self-selection problem. Thus, we do not include IPOs on or after 2001.
The IPO selection criteria are as follows. We exclude ADRs, closed-end funds, REITS,
¯nancial institutions, private placement, rights and unit issues. We also exclude IPOs in which
the contract between the underwriter and the issuing ¯rm does not entail ¯rm commitment.
This selection results in 1,245 ¯rms.
We use the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database to obtain the list of issuing ¯rms,
the o®er date, information on whether they were venture-backed, the list of lead underwriters,
the book managers, and the set of all underwriters. We cross-check this information with that in
the IPO's last amended prospectus ¯led with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
We also use the prospectus to gather ¯rm characteristics reported in the balance sheet, income
statement, and cash°ow statement for the IPO year (or the previous one) and, if available, for
the year in which the ¯rm and the bank established their relationship.
To be included in our sample, the issuing ¯rms must have at least one pre-IPO banking
relationship within ¯ve years prior to the IPO reported in Dealscan. The Dealscan database5
is compiled by the Loan Pricing Corporation, and contains detailed information on syndicated
loan contract terms, the identity of the loan's lead arranging bank as well as all other par-
ticipants, as well as other loan characteristics (such as loan purpose and type). The primary
sources of data for Dealscan are attachments on SEC 10-K ¯lings and reports from the lending
institutions. The minimum cuto® loan amount needed for Dealscan to record a loan is $100,000.
Thus, the ¯rms in our sample have at least one loan of $100,000 or more. Furthermore, we
exclude the ¯rms that report either less than a whole year of ¯nancial data or only pro-forma
¯nancial statements for the IPO year (or the previous one). These last two requirements restrict
our sample to 306 ¯rms. We report summary statistics on their characteristics in Table 1.
We use COMPUSTAT data to examine the characteristics of the excluded ¯rms. For each
company we record the ¯rst entry in the database, which corresponds to either the IPO year
or the ¯rst data year available in the prospectus (if the prospectus included pre-IPO data and
COMPUSTAT back¯led that data within a three-year period prior to the IPO date). Compared
to the IPOs in the sample, excluded ¯rms are smaller. For instance, mean current assets are
$15.75 million for excluded ¯rms vs. $20.97 million for sample IPOs. Average sales are $334.32
million, lower than the $481.98 million for sample IPOs. Mean underpricing (which correlates
negatively with ¯rm size, e.g., Beatty and Ritter (1986)) is 56.65% vs. 45.13%. Further, mean
long-term debt and debt due in one year are $95.92 and $9.09 million, respectively, compared
to $144.34 and $11.16 million for sample ¯rms. Thus, the stake of a bank in these stocks is
smaller, which makes these ¯rms less exposed to con°icts of interest (Puri (1999)). Also, for
these ¯rms we cannot always determine whether there was a relationship bank which could, or
did, take them public. As such, we cannot determine whether a potential con°ict of interest
existed. In contrast, the companies we investigate are a homogeneous sample of ¯rms that have
received a signi¯cant stake from their relationship bank, and are therefore more highly a®ected
by the costs and bene¯ts of going public with their bank.
The requirement that the ¯rms in our sample have at least one banking relationship reported
in Dealscan prior to the IPO includes direct lending relationship (the bank lent its own funds
to the ¯rm) as well as underwriting relationship (the ¯rm has a relationship with a bank that
previously managed the ¯rm's private or public debt placement). Both types of relationship
can lead to certi¯cation or con°icts of interest if the relationship bank manages the ¯rm's IPO.
In the case of lending relationships, the lending bank monitors and audits the ¯rm closely, so it
will generate information that the bank can use to accurately certify the value of the ¯rm's new
issue. But because the bank has lent to the ¯rm, it is also more likely to fall prey to con°icts
of interest when underwriting the ¯rm's IPO. In the case of underwriting relationships, the
bank has its reputation capital at stake. Since the bank sells the ¯rm's debt on the market
(public issue) or to a group of private investors (private placement), the bank has an incentive6
to protect the interest of the investors who purchased such debt. As such, it might also have
an incentive to over-represent the value of its client ¯rm value when underwriting its IPO.
2.2 Pre-IPO lending relationship variables
We separate ¯rms that went public with at least one of their relationship banks (°agged with
a binary variable Certify = 1) and ¯rms that did not go public with any of their relationship
banks (for which we code Certify = 0).
In doing so, we carefully track the linkage between Section 20 subsidiaries that underwrote
the IPOs and the commercial bank (or bank holding company) to which such subsidiary be-
longed. Speci¯cally, for each Section 20 subsidiary, we record the date on which the Board
of Governors granted the bank holding company initial approval, as reported on the Board
of Governors site at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/subsidiaries/. For Section 20
subsidiaries that are not listed on the Board of Governors site we obtained information by
contacting the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Before that date, commercial banks were
not authorized to underwrite their clients' securities issues.
We also track whether the ¯rm's relationship bank merged with a bank that had underwrit-
ing abilities before (or after) the ¯rm's IPO. That is, for each IPO we check whether the ¯rm's
relationship bank had an authorized Section 20 subsidiary operating at the time of that IPO. If
such Section 20 subsidiary, or another relationship bank with underwriting powers, underwrote
the IPO we code Certify = 1. The list of bank mergers is in Figure 1, page 310, of Ljungqvist,
Marston, and Wilhelm (2004).
2.3 Stock returns
We collect return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We
follow each ¯rm from its stock's second trading day or, if that is not available, from the ¯rst
day on which stock returns become listed in the CRSP ¯les, i.e., date tstart (we separately study
buy-and-hold returns inclusive of the ¯rst-trading-day return). The holding period ends after
T years or on the stock's delisting date, whichever comes ¯rst, i.e., date min(T;tdelist), where






(1 + ri;s) ¡ 1
3
5; (1)
where for each ¯rm i, ri;s is the day-s return inclusive of distributions and adjusted for stock
splits.7






(1 + rPi;s) ¡ 1
3
5; (2)
where rPi;s is the day-s return on one of two alternative portfolios.
The ¯rst, most relevant, benchmark is determined by the returns on 100 portfolios of stocks
ranked by size and book-to-market. The portfolios, constructed at the end of each June, are
the intersections of ten portfolios formed on size (market equity, ME) and ten portfolios formed
on the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME). We obtained daily returns on these
portfolios from Ken French's data library. We pair each stock i with the benchmark portfolio
that has the closest ME and BE/ME. We also consider four alternative benchmarks that are
commonly used in the literature. They are the return on the CRSP value-weighted market
portfolio inclusive of all distributions; the return on the S&P500 and Nasdaq indices inclusive
of distributions; and return on the 49 industry-ranked portfolios, also from Ken French's data
library.
3 Empirical Predictions and Analysis
We brie°y review the two competing theories, certi¯cation and con°ict of interest, in Section 3.1.
Then in the rest of the section we formulate and test their predictions. In Section 3.2 we examine
the predictions for buy-and-hold abnormal returns in an event-time long-run performance study,
while in Section 3.3 we follow a calendar-time approach. Section 3.4 deals with the selection of
¯rms that go public with their bank.
3.1 Certi¯cation and con°ict of interest
Puri (1999) argues that commercial banks, as lenders to ¯rms, can obtain better prices for
securities issues than investment houses particularly when costs of information production are
high. Similarly, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) note that banks may have ¯rm-speci¯c information
which would give them an advantage over investment banks in underwriting more information-
sensitive securities. Puri (1996) ¯nds evidence that supports these predictions in her study
of bond issues, i.e., she shows that there is a higher net certi¯cation e®ect for more junior
securities.
As such, IPOs underwritten by commercial banks are an interesting data set to investigate
the con°ict-of-interest and certi¯cation debate. First, the pricing of equity is more information-
sensitive than the pricing of debt. Thus, an inside bank can play an even more important role
in resolving asymmetric information problems when underwriting its client's equity. Second,8
since equity is junior to debt, equity holders face a much higher risk of expropriation than debt
holders do. Therefore the costs associated to potential con°ict of interest are higher too.
The certi¯cation theory states that relationship banks that manage their clients' IPOs use
their proprietary ¯rm-speci¯c information to price these stocks more accurately than an unin-
formed bank with no ties to the ¯rm. Further, relationship banks have an incentive to avoid
the underwriting of low-value clients, which are typically higher-risk IPOs that could expose
the bank to a con°ict of interest. This selection mechanism is reinforced because high-value
¯rms also have an incentive to go public with their bank, which is in a position to certify the
high value of their stock. In contrast, low-value ¯rms are indi®erent between staying with their
bank (which would only take them public at a low price) or switching to an outside underwriter
(which would infer the ¯rm is low value and therefore would place it at a low price).
The con°ict-of-interest theory states that relationship banks that manage their clients'
IPOs use their proprietary ¯rm-speci¯c information to fool the public into buying overpriced
securities. Further, banks do not shy away from underwriting the IPOs of their low-value ¯rms.
There is no selection in the ¯rm-underwriter match, nor any di®erence in the valuations of
IPOs underwritten by their bank and stocks taken public by independent banks.
3.2 Event-time analysis of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns
If certi¯cation prevails, IPOs underwritten by relationship banks are priced accurately. Thus,
a testable prediction of the certi¯cation theory is that there should be no long-run under-
performance for these stocks. However, the joint-hypothesis problem of testing this condition
along with a certain asset pricing model for expected returns clouds the interpretation of the
test's results. Here, our preferred approach is to measure the abnormal return as the di®erence
between the event ¯rm's return and the return on a portfolio of stocks that are similar on market
size and book-to-market. These characteristics are know to be related to average returns (e.g.,
Fama and French (1992), Daniel and Titman (1997), Daniel et al. (1997)). There may still be
a concern that this approach does not fully control for cross-¯rm variation in average returns
due to di®erences in expected returns and to chance sample-speci¯c patterns in average returns
(e.g., Fama (1998)). As such, in our tests we focus on the di®erence in BHARs between IPOs
underwritten by relationship banks and a matching sample of stocks with similar characteristics.
Speci¯cally, we test the null
H0: There is zero di®erence between the BHARs on stocks that went public with a relationship
bank and the BHARs on stocks taken public by an independent underwriter
against the alternative that the BHARs are di®erent.9
3.2.1 Matching criteria
For each IPO issued by the ¯rm's relationship bank, we identify a matching ¯rm that is brought
to the market by an independent bank. We start by looking for a matching ¯rm's IPO that has
been issued within seven days prior to the IPO date of the stock managed by its relationship
bank. We rank the candidate matches that satisfy this requirement by the value of their
BE/ME, and we identify the stock that has a book-to-market ratio closest to, but higher than,
that of the IPO originated by the relationship bank.1
We favor matching stocks with higher book-to-market ratios because they typically yield
higher returns. That is, we bias the results of the long-run performance analysis against the
prediction of the certi¯cation theory, which is our null hypothesis. Although we would also
like to match stocks by size, as measured, e.g., by market value of equity, due to the limited
number of ¯rms in our sample we do not simultaneously match by size and book-to-market.
We do however repeat the analysis by matching IPOs on market size and IPO date only, and
¯nd similar results.
If the BE/ME ratios of the two paired ¯rms are within a narrow range, we ¯nalize the
match. If not, we keep looking for a match among the ¯rms that went public within two
weeks prior to the IPO date of the stock managed by the relationship bank; we follow the
same strategy, except that we accept ¯rms that are in a slightly wider BE/ME range. If we
are still unsuccessful, we continue to expand the issuing window, up to three months. With
this approach, we e±ciently ¯nd matching ¯rms that typically went public within a month and
have a BE/ME ratio close to that of the stock to which they are paired. Only a very limited
number of matches fall within the wider three-month window.
If a matching company is delisted before its corresponding stock is issued by a relationship
bank, then after its delisting date we use a similar strategy to replace it with a substitute
match. If the substitute match is also delisted, we look for yet another substitute, and so on.
3.2.2 Empirical ¯ndings
First, we follow Ritter (1991) and examine wealth relatives. We compute the average buy-and-
hold return across the stocks underwritten by relationship banks, RT;S, and the average return
on stocks in the matching sample, RT;M. The wealth relative is the ratio (1+RT;S)=(1+RT;M).
Table 2 reports the results for di®erent holding periods and matching criteria. In all cases,
wealth ratios are larger than one when the holding period is one year. Wealth ratios remain
1Our matching criteria are similar to those used in other studies that investigate the long-run performance
of IPOs and seasoned equity o®ers (e.g., Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), and Loughran and Ritter (1995)).
However, there is a signi¯cant di®erence. In our study, the matching ¯rms are themselves IPO stocks. This is
why we look for a match whose IPO date is close to that of the stock issued by the relationship bank.10
higher than one at longer holding periods except for the case in which we use the book-to-market
ratio as a matching criterion and returns are equally weighted. Overall, these results provide
some mixed evidence that IPOs underwritten by relationship banks did not underperform
similar stocks taken public by independent banks.








where RPi;T is the buy-and-hold benchmark portfolio return and the holding period T is one,
two, or three years. It is well known that the skewness of BHARs can bias the inference in
a long-run performance study (e.g., Barber and Lyon (1997), Brav (2000), Brav et al. (2000),
Eberhart and Siddique (2002), Fama (1998), Ikenberry et al. (1995), Kothari and Warner
(1997 and 2006), Loughran and Ritter (2000), and Mitchell and Sta®ord (2000)). As a partial
remedy to the problem, here we conduct inference based on the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted
t-statistics of Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999).2
Table 3 contains results for the case in which stocks are matched by IPO date and book-
to-market ratio. The matching criterion based on the market value of equity yields similar
results, available from the authors on request. Throughout the table we use a yearly decimal
scaling. As such, a mean abnormal return of, e.g., 0.01 indicates that the stocks in that portfolio
outperformed the benchmark by 1% per year.
When returns are equally weighted, the abnormal return on both sample and matching
stocks is insigni¯cant, i.e., both samples of stocks were priced accurately. The di®erence between
mean returns on stocks in the sample and in the matching group is also insigni¯cant. This
¯ndings holds regardless of the benchmark and the holding period considered (Panel A). We
reach similar conclusions when we break down stocks by IPO year, except that we ¯nd some
evidence that 1999 IPOs underwritten by their bank did better than the other stocks at the one
year horizon (Panel C). At longer maturities, however, any di®erence in performance dissipates.
Economically, the di®erence in performance is 18 percent per year when the benchmark is the
return on a portfolio of stocks ranked by size and book-to-market and the holding period is
one year from the IPO date (Panel A, FF row, column 3). This ¯gure drops to negative nine
percent per year when the holding period increases to three years (Panel A, FF row, column
9).
Similar conclusions apply to the case in which returns are value weighted, except that IPOs
taken public by their bank have underperformed all benchmarks at the one year horizon (Panel
2Speci¯cally, we compute the skewness adjusted t-ratio in equation (5), page 174 of Lyon, Barber, and Tsai
(1999). We calculate the transformed test statistics in equation (6), page 174, for 10,000 resamples each of size
1/2 of the original sample of BHARs (resamples of size 1/4 give similar results). We compute critical values
from the 10,000 realizations of such transformed test statistics.11
B). This result is mainly driven by the relatively poor performance of IPOs that went public in
1999 (Panel D). However, when compared to the stocks in the matching sample we do not ¯nd
a signi¯cant di®erence in performance (Panels B and D). Economically, the abnormal returns
on the long-short strategy are approximately 10% for the one-year holding period and they
decrease to a few percentage points per year over longer horizons (Panel B).
Overall, this analysis suggests that IPOs underwritten by their relationship bank did not
underperform the control sample of stocks. In unreported results we also repeat the analysis
by including the ¯rst-trading-day return to the total return measures in equations (1) and (2).
We reach the same conclusion. This is consistent with Schenone (2004), who shows that IPO
underpricing does not depend on whether a ¯rm goes public with its bank.
3.2.3 Correcting cross-sectional correlation and skewness biases
The skewness-adjusted statistics that we employed in Section 3.2.2 do not fully correct for
the correlation of event-¯rm abnormal returns that overlap in calendar time. It is well known
that ignoring this problem is likely to produce overstated test statistics (e.g., Brav (2000),
Fama (1998), Kothary and Warner (2004), and Mitchell and Sta®ord (2000)). As such, here
we attempt to deal with the cross-sectional dependence and the skewness of individual-¯rm
long-run BHARs by following an alternative approach.







As the holding period T shrinks to zero, this measure converges to the BHAR de¯nition (3).
Further, it retains some of the intuitive appeal of the more conventional BHAR de¯nition (3),
in that it is a monotonic transformation of a ratio which `represents the investor experience'
(Lyon et al. (1999)). One advantage, however, is that at longer horizons the skewness problem
is considerably attenuated when we use de¯nition (4). This is evident from Figure 1, which
shows that for all holding periods the empirical distribution of the BHARs is much more
symmetric when we use de¯nition (4). Table 4 compares skewness and kurtosis for the two
BHAR variables. When we use de¯nition (4) we ¯nd values that are much closer to zero and
three, respectively, which are the benchmarks for a standard normal distribution.






= ¯0 + ¯Certify Certifyi + "i : (5)
Ordinary least squares estimates of ¯0 and ¯Certify would yield estimates of the mean BHAR for
IPOs underwritten by relationship and independent banks. However, conventional t-ratios, even12
if computed with a bootstrapping procedure, would be contaminated by the cross-dependence
problem. To deal with this problem we estimate the regression (5) by generalized least squares
(GLS). For this application we need an estimate for the covariance matrix of the error term ",
which we calculate as shown below.
For each pair of stocks i and j we estimate the covariances of the dependent variables in












































where ri;t and rj;t are the day-t total returns on stocks i and j, respectively; ­i;j is the set of
overlapping trading dates in the buy-and-hold periods of stocks i and j; and b E(²) denotes the
sample mean of a random variable.
We require a minimum of three months of overlap in the buy-and-hold periods of any stock
pair i and j to estimate the covariance in (6). If ­i;j is shorter than three months, we ¯x the
cross-sectional covariance between stocks i and j at zero. We obtain the variance estimate for
any stock i by setting i = j in (6). In that case, the overlapping trading window ­i;i coincides
with the entire buy-and-hold period for that stock i.
As the intra-period return frequency increases, (6) converges to the cross-sectional covari-
ances of the dependent variables in (5) (e.g., Andersen et al. (2003) and Jagannathan and Ma
(2003)). Since the regressors in the right-hand side of (5) are constant over the holding period,
our approach immediately yields a consistent and positive-de¯nite estimate of the covariance
matrix of the error term ", which we use to ¯t model (5) by GLS.
3.2.4 Empirical results
In Table 5 we report mean abnormal return estimates. For stocks underwritten by relationship
banks we compute the mean abnormal return as (^ ¯0 + ^ ¯Certify), where ^ ¯0 and ^ ¯Certify are the
GLS estimates of the coe±cients in equation (5). For stocks managed by independent banks,
the mean abnormal return estimate is ^ ¯0. The di®erence between the two means is measured
by ^ ¯Certify. t-ratios in square brackets are computed using the GLS standard errors.
In panel A we report results for all IPOs from 1998 to 2000. We ¯nd some evidence that
IPOs taken public by their bank have overperformed the other stocks when the holding period
is one year (Panel A, FF row, column 3). A break-down by IPO year suggests that this result
is driven by the poor performance of stocks taken public by independent banks in 1999 (Panel
B, column 3). However, when we consider holding periods of two and three years we do not
¯nd any di®erence in performance between the two groups of stocks regardless of the IPO year.13
3.2.5 Robustness of the results
Among the members of a lending syndicate, the lead lender is likely to acquire the most in-
formation on the ¯rm. Thus as a robustness check we replace Certify in equation (5) with
a binary variable that takes value one when the lead lender is a member of the IPO syndi-
cate. The results, not reported here, are unchanged: during the ¯rst year since the IPO date
stocks underwritten by their bank overperformed other IPOs, but for longer holding periods
any di®erence in performance dissipates.
Prior studies have examined the linkage between the performance of an IPO and its char-
acteristics. For instance, Puri (1999) argues that if banks have smaller claims in a ¯rm, their
potential con°ict of interest is lower and therefore they can fetch higher prices. Other studies
focused instead on the e®ect of venture backing on IPO performance. A venture capitalist
holding ¯nancial claims in a ¯rm faces a con°ict of interest. However, the same venture cap-
italist could reduce the asymmetric information problem and act as a certi¯er of the new
issue's value. If venture-backed companies are better than nonventure-backed ones, investors
should incorporate these expectations in market prices. Empirical evidence supports this view:
venture-backed IPOs are valued higher than nonventure-backed stocks at the time of the IPO
(Megginson and Weiss (1991)); venture investment by lead underwriters signi¯cantly reduces
IPO underpricing (Li and Masulis (2003)); and venture-backed IPOs perform at least as well as
other stocks over the long run (Brav and Gompers (1997), Gompers and Lerner (1999)). Also
related, the reputation of the underwriting bank could have a positive e®ect on the future of
the ¯rm and this e®ect may not be fully incorporated in market prices (Carter et al. (1998)).
Here we examine whether the ¯ndings of Section 3.2.4 are robust to controlling for these






= ¯0 + ¯Certify Certifyi + ¯
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XXi + "i ; (7)
where Xi includes variables in the following categories:
Bank exposure to the issuing ¯rm: Firm's leverage and `IPO purpose.'
Venture capital backing: A binary variable that identi¯es venture-backed IPOs.
Underwriter reputation: The underwriter's market share during the IPO year.
`IPO purpose' is a categorical variable that equals one when the prospectus states that the
IPO is meant to re¯nance or repay bank debt. The underwriter's market share during the IPO
year is a commonly used measure of underwriter reputation which correlates highly with other
proxies for reputations, e.g., the positioning of the underwriter's name in the IPO's tombstone
(Carter et al. (1998)).14
The results are available from the authors upon request. The main ¯nding is that ¯Certify
remains insigni¯cant and its point estimate is similar to what we obtained for the univariate
regression (5). The coe±cients on the other control variables are also insigni¯cant. There
are, however, two exceptions. First, the coe±cient on the `IPO purpose' variable is negative
and signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent level when the holding period is one year. This evidence
suggests that investors may have underestimated the ¯rm's motive to pay back bank's debt
with the IPO proceeds. However, at longer holding periods (two and three years) the same
coe±cient is insigni¯cant. Second, the coe±cient on the `venture capital' variable is negative
and signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent level when the holding period is one year. This is at odds
with the conclusions of the literature that has examined the performance of venture-backed
IPOs. Again, however, this result is not robust to the choice of the holding period: at the two-
and three-year horizons the same coe±cient is insigni¯cant.
3.3 Calendar-time analysis of the portfolio returns
Although we attempt to eliminate the e®ect of cross-sectional correlation in buy-and-hold re-
turns, there could be legitimate concerns that our approach to do so may still be inadequate.
As such, here we pursue a calendar-time approach (e.g., Fama (1998)).
As we did in the event-time study, for each IPO issued by the ¯rm's relationship bank we
identify a matching ¯rm that is brought to the market by an independent bank. The matching
criteria are identical to those discussed in Section 3.2.1, except that now we consider matching
¯rms that went public within a certain window before or after (rather than prior to) the IPO
date of the stock taken public by a relationship bank. That is, we ¯rst look for a matching
¯rm's IPO that has been issued within plus or minus seven days from the IPO date of the stock
managed by its bank. We progressively expand that interval to plus or minus three months
from the IPO date.
Once we have identi¯ed a sample of matching stocks, we compute both equal- and value-
weighted returns on two portfolios, PS and PM. The ¯rst, PS, consists of a long position in the
stocks issued by relationship banks. The second, PM, comprises a simultaneous long position
in the corresponding matching stocks. We add a stock to both portfolios starting from the
¯rst week when both the stock issued by the relationship bank and its match are ¯rst listed.
When a stock in the matching sample is delisted, we splice its returns with the returns on the
substitute matching stock. We hold each pair of stocks in the portfolios PS and PM for a period
that ranges from one to three years.
We consider a zero-cost investment strategy that entails a long position in portfolio PS and a
short position in portfolio PM. We test the performance of PS, PM, and the long-short strategy
PS ¡PM using the Fama and French (1993) linear three-factor model, augmented with a fourth15
`momentum' factor as in Carhart (1997):
rP;t = ® + ¯M (rM;t ¡ rF;t) + ¯HML HMLt + ¯SMB SMBt + ¯UMD UMDt + "t ; (8)
where rM;t ¡ rF;t is the week-t excess return on the market portfolio; SMBt is the di®erence
between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks
in week t; HMLt is the di®erence between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market
stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks in week t; and UMDt is the
week-t return on a momentum portfolio that is long stocks that have performed well in the past
and short stocks that have performed poorly in the past. The data on the SMBt, HMLt, and
UMDt factors are from Ken French's data library.
If certi¯cation prevails, then we have
H0: ® = 0
We test this null hypothesis against the alternative that ® 6= 0.
3.3.1 Empirical ¯ndings
We report estimation results for the regression (8) in Table 6. In Columns 1-3 the dependent
variable rP;t is the weekly excess return on the sample portfolio, PS: rPS;t ¡ rF;t. In Columns
4-6, it is the weekly excess return on the matching portfolio, PM: rPM;t ¡ rF;t. In Columns
7-9, the dependent variable is the weekly excess return on the portfolio that is long in the
sample portfolio and short in the matching portfolio, PS ¡ PM: rPS;t ¡ rPM;t: In Panels A and
C portfolio returns are equally weighted, while in Panels B and D they are value weighted. In
Panels A and B the matching criteria are the IPO date and the book-to-market ratio, while
in Panels C and D they are the IPO date and the market value of equity. Columns 1Y, 2Y,
and 3Y report estimation results corresponding to holding periods of one, two, and three years
for the stocks in the portfolios. In all regressions we use yearly decimal scaling for the return
series. As such, an ® estimate of, say, 0.01, indicates that a portfolio has had an abnormal
return of 1% per year.
For regressions that have returns on the portfolios PS and PM as a dependent variable we ¯nd
that all factors are priced. As expected, the coe±cients on the market, SMB, HML, and UMD
factors are all signi¯cant and the explanatory power of the regressions is high. But for the long-
short portfolio PS¡PM most factor loadings are insigni¯cant (Columns 7-9). In particular, this
¯nding applies to the UMD factor. That is, although we have not explicitly used momentum
as a matching criterion, the portfolio of matching stocks has a loading on the momentum factor
that is very close to that of the portfolio of stocks underwritten by relationship banks. In some
cases, the HML factor remains signi¯cant. This occurs especially when the holding horizon of16
the stocks in the portfolio is longer (two and three years). Not surprisingly, the HML factor is
signi¯cant when the matching criteria are the IPO date and the market value of equity (Panels
C and D). Further, the adjusted R2 coe±cient drops signi¯cantly when the dependent variable
is the return on the long-short portfolio. In particular it is in most cases close to zero when
the matching criteria are the IPO date and the book-to-market ratio. Overall, these results
show that we have eliminated most sources of systematic risk from the long-short portfolios,
especially when the matching criteria are the IPO date and the book-to-market ratio.
We then proceed to examine the performance of the three portfolios. In almost all re-
gressions, the ® coe±cients are insigni¯cant. This ¯nding applies not only to the long-short
PS¡PM strategy, but also to the individual portfolios PS and PM. Further, in most cases the ®
estimates are also economically small. For instance, the long-short portfolio has an insigni¯cant
abnormal return of 1% per year when the holding periods are two or three years, the matching
criteria are the IPO date and the book-to-market ratio, and returns are value weighted (Table
6, Panel B, columns 8 and 9). When returns are equally weighted, the abnormal return is
approximately 10% per year and insigni¯cant (Panel A, columns 8 and 9). This di®erence in
point estimates is likely driven by the relatively higher weight that smaller stocks are given
when all stocks are given the same weight in the portfolio.
One exception to these ¯ndings concerns the ® coe±cient on the PS portfolio when the
holding period is one year and the matching criteria are the IPO date and the book-to-market
ratio. When returns are equally weighted, we ¯nd ® = 0:33, signi¯cant at the 5% level (Table
6, Panel A, column 1). This results suggests that stocks underwritten by relationship banks
had a 33% abnormal return per year when the holding period in the portfolio for these IPOs
is one year. Related, we ¯nd ® = 0:35, signi¯cant at the 5% level, for the returns on the
long-short portfolio PS ¡PM (Panel A, column 7), i.e., based on this metric IPOs underwritten
by relationship banks outperformed stocks taken public by independent banks. These ¯ndings,
however, are not robust. For instance, when returns are value-weighted, the ® coe±cient on
the PS portfolio is insigni¯cant (Panel B, column 1). Similarly, when the matching criteria are
the IPO date and the market value of equity, the ® estimates are insigni¯cant for all portfolios
and holding periods (Panels C and D).
Overall, this evidence suggests that the IPOs in our sample are priced accurately and, in
particular, that there is no di®erence in performance between the IPOs taken public by either
relationship or outside banks. There is some evidence that the pricing of IPOs did not fully
incorporate the certi¯cation premium generated by relationship banks, but this ¯nding is not
robust to the choice of the holding period and the matching criteria.17
3.4 Firm-underwriter selection and market valuation
We examine the selection of ¯rms that go public with their relationship bank with a selection
model similar to the one used by Puri (1996) and reviewed by Li and Prabhala (2005).3 The
selection variable Wi is a function of explanatory variables Zi,
Certifyi = 1 i® Wi = Zi° + ´i > 0
Certifyi = 0 i® Wi = Zi° + ´i · 0;
(9)
where Zi denotes publicly available information that a®ects the ¯rm i's decision to go public
with its relationship bank, ° is a vector of probit coe±cients, and ´i is orthogonal to the publicly
observable variables Zi: Intuitively, the ¯rm goes public with its bank if the bene¯ts of doing so
exceed its cost as represented by the condition Wi = Zi° +´i > 0. The ¯rm valuation equation
is:
Valuei = Xi¯ + ²i ; (10)
where Xi denotes observable characteristics that determine ¯rm value, ¯ is a vector of coef-
¯cients to be estimated, and ²i is orthogonal to the publicly observable variables Xi: Simi-
lar to Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), we normalize market value by ¯rm size, i.e.,
Valuei = log
³
Market Value of Equity




If, as we conjecture, ¯rms of certain value select to go public with their pre-IPO banks
and these banks choose to manage their IPO (i.e., the ¯rm-bank match is not random), then
²i in equation (10) and ´i in equation (9) are correlated. In particular, as is standard in
this literature we assume that ²i and ´i have a mean-zero bivariate normal distribution with
var(´) = 1, var(²) = ¾2
", and cov(´;²) = ¾´;".
For the ¯rms that select to go public with their pre-IPO relationship bank we have
Valuei j(Certifyi = 1) = Xi¯ + (²i jZi° + ´i > 0)
= Xi¯ + ¼ (´i jZi° + ´i > 0) + Ài ; (11)
where ²i j´i = ¼´i + Ài and Ài is an orthogonal mean-zero error term. Taking expectations of
equation (11) we obtain
E (Valuei jCertifyi = 1) = Xi¯ + ¼E (´i jZi° + ´i > 0) : (12)
Similarly, for the ¯rms that go public with an outside bank we have
E (Valuei jCertifyi = 0) = Xi¯ + ¼E (´i jZi° + ´i · 0) : (13)
3Schenone (2004) examines the ¯rm's choice of a pre-IPO lender during the 1998-2000 period. She uses a
Heckman two-step procedure to study whether there is selection among the ¯rms that establish a relationship
with a bank that can later underwrite their IPO, and ¯nds no evidence that these ¯rms acted strategically when
establishing a pre-IPO banking relationship with a prospective underwriter. However, she does not examine the
selection of ¯rms that go public with their bank.18
We have assumed that ²i and ´i are bivariate normal, thus E (´i jZi° + ´i > 0) =
Á(Zi°)
©(Zi°) and
E (´i jZi° + ´i · 0) = ¡
Á(Zi°)
1¡©(Zi°): Equation (10) therefore becomes:
Valuei = Xi¯ + ¼Certifyi
Á(Zi°)
©(Zi°)













+ ºi : (14)
Note that ¼ = ½´²¾²; where ½´² is the correlation coe±cient between ² and ´ and ¾² is the
standard deviation of ²: Intuitively, the last term in equation (14) can be interpreted as the
market's updated information regarding the value of the ¯rm once the market observes the ¯rm's
choice of bank. That is, when investors observe a ¯rm selecting in either the Certifyi = 1 or
the Certifyi = 0 categories, they update their priors about the ¯rm's value, and this updated
information is incorporated in the valuation equation. The test for self-selection hinges on the
estimate and signi¯cance of ¼: If ¼ = 0; then ¯rms are randomly selecting whether to go public
with their pre-IPO relationship bank, if ¼ > 0 then ¯rms that are likely to go public with their
relationship bank have a higher valuation, and if ¼ < 0 then ¯rms that are likely to go public
with their relationship bank have a lower valuation.
We estimate equation (14) using a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. In the ¯rst step,
we ¯t a probit model by maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate ^ ° in equation (9). We










in equation (14) and we ¯t the regression
by ordinary least squares (OLS). In the second-step regression, the standard errors for the ¯
coe±cient must be corrected for the fact that (1) we ¯x ° at the ¯rst-step estimate ^ ° and (2)
the error term ºi may be heteroskedastic. We compute corrected standard errors by using the
bootstrapping method (we estimate ^ ° and ^ ¯ for 1,000 resamples with replacement, each of the
size of the original data set, and compute bootstrapped standard errors as in Greene (2003),
page 924).
In the ¯rst estimation step we need instruments that explain whether the ¯rm goes public
with the relationship bank but are uncorrelated with the ¯rm's post-IPO market value. We
¯nd that (1) the number of banks in the lending syndicate and (2) the percentage of the loan
contributed by the lead lender correlate highly with Certify but not with the ¯rm's market
value. Since the correlation between these two instruments is also high, we only include one of
the two, the number of banks in the lending syndicate.
The results in Table 7 show that the ¯rm-bank selection is not random. Speci¯cally, the
¼ coe±cient in equation (14) is signi¯cant at the 5 or 10 percent levels depending on the
characteristics included in the variable X. Further, the point estimate ^ ¼ is positive and stable
across di®erent speci¯cations, ranging from 0.22 to 0.29. These ¯ndings indicate that ¯rms19
that go public with their relationship bank are valued higher than ¯rms that did not go public
with their bank.
The estimates for the other coe±cients on the characteristics included in the Xi variable are
also signi¯cant and their sign is consistent with a priori intuition. For instance, larger ¯rms are
valued higher, but at a decreasing rate (the coe±cient on Log(Assets) is positive and signi¯cant
and the coe±cient on the squared value of Log(Assets) is negative and signi¯cant). Firms with
higher cash°ows to assets are valued higher. Further, ¯rms in which the ratio of shares sold by
existing shareholders to the total number of shares issued (an indicator for the ¯rm's managers
desire to cash out their investment) are valued lower.
Overall, these ¯ndings support the certi¯cation hypothesis: in an attempt to shy away from
potential con°icts of interest, relationship banks carefully select to take public their higher
value clients. This conclusion is consistent with the evidence in Puri (1996), who estimates a
similar selection model and ¯nds that bond underwriting by commercial banks conveys positive
information about the issuer that improves the prices at which the debt o®ering can be sold.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
When a bank lends funds to a ¯rm, it acquires privileged information on its client. What
use the bank will make of such information is controversial. If the ¯rm decides to issue new
securities, the bank is in a position to convey its privileged information to less knowledgeable
market participants and to act as a certi¯er of the new issue's true value. But, because of
adverse selection problems the bank might fall prey to con°icts of interest and help its client
to issue junior claims for more than their worth.
Prior to 1998 there was little involvement by commercial banks in the market of equity
issues. As such, much of the debate on con°ict of interest and certi¯cation in the market for
IPOs focused on IPOs underwritten by investment banks that hold a venture capital position
in the issuing ¯rm. For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1999) ¯nd that IPOs underwritten by
investment banks that hold a venture capital position in the issuing ¯rm are sold at a greater
discount than similar IPOs managed by independent banks, yet over the long run these stocks
perform no worse, and may actually perform better, than o®erings in which no underwriter has
a venture stake. Li and Masulis (2003) show that venture investment in the issuing ¯rm by the
lead underwriter can signi¯cantly reduce IPO underpricing.4
In this paper we contribute to the debate by presenting evidence based on a new sample,
IPOs managed by commercial banks. We focus on two sets of test. First, we investigate the
4Also related, other studies have found that venture capital backing has a positive e®ect on an IPO's
performance (e.g., Aggarwal and Klapper (2003), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Megginson and Weiss (1991).20
long-run performance of the IPOs underwritten by the ¯rm's bank. As such, we add to Schenone
(2004) who examines IPOs managed by relationship banks but focuses on their ¯rst-trading-
day performance. Using a cross-sectional model, we ¯nd that IPOs managed by inside banks
experience buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns that are similar to those observed for a
matching sample of stocks managed by outside banks. Further, we examine the calendar-time
returns on a portfolio that is long the stocks underwritten by relationship banks and short
ex-ante similar stocks taken public by independent institutions. We test the performance of
this trading strategy using a linear four-factor model. Again, we conclude that the IPOs taken
public by their bank perform at least as well as ex-ante similar stocks managed by independent
institutions.
Second, we argue that the concern for con°icts of interest can generate self-selection among
the ¯rms that go public with their bank. We use a two-step procedure to estimate a Heckman
(1979) type model similar to that of Puri (1996). We ¯nd that the outcome of going public with a
relationship bank is not random. High-value ¯rms that could go public with their bank typically
do so, while lower-value ¯rms go public with an independent underwriter. This evidence adds
to Schenone (2004), who studies IPO valuation but does not examine the selection of ¯rms
that go public with their bank, and to Yasuda (2005), who examines a sample of debt issues
and shows that bank relationships have positive and signi¯cant e®ects on a ¯rm's underwriter
choice.
The recent literature has examined multiple aspects of universal banking.5 For instance,
Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) and Yasuda (2005) investigate the competitive e®ect of com-
mercial banks entry in the market of debt issues and ¯nd evidence consistent with the market
becoming more competitive. However, Kanatas and Qi (2003) warn that an integrated ¯nan-
cial services market can be less innovative than one with specialized intermediaries. Further,
Drucker and Puri (2005) show that investment banks engage in a substantial amount of tying
and that this practice allows ¯rms to reduce their ¯nancing costs when issuing debt.
We add to this literature by presenting evidence that supports the certi¯cation role of re-
lationship banks underwriting their clients' IPOs. This is consistent with the predictions of
Puri's (1999) model and with the ¯ndings of the literature that has examined the certi¯ca-
tion role of commercial banks that underwrite debt issues (e.g., Kroszner and Rajan (1994),
Gande et al. (1997), and Puri (1994, 1996)). Further, our results complement the evidence
in Schenone (2004), who shows that pre-IPO banking relationships reduce the asymmetric
information problems faced by ¯rst-time issuers.
Our results can be interpreted as follows. Relationship banks avoid potential con°icts
of interest by choosing to underwrite their best clients' IPOs. Rational investors anticipate
5Drucker and Puri (2006) provide an extensive survey of this literature.21
the bank's reaction and value issues underwritten by the pre-IPO lender higher than IPOs
managed by independent banks. The market is not fooled. Over the long run, IPOs managed
by relationship banks do not underperform similar issues managed by outside banks. In sum,
our ¯ndings indicate that in this respect the e®ect of the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of
the Glass-Steagall Act has not been negative.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics at the Time of the IPO. The data are
hand-collected from the ¯nancial statements reported in the last amended prospectus ¯led with
the SEC, for the last complete calendar year prior to the ¯rm's IPO. All values are expressed
in thousands of U.S. dollars. Certify equals one if the ¯rm went public with its relationship
bank, and zero otherwise. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Firm Characteristics All IPOs Certify = 1 Certify = 0
Total Assets 356,701 1,033,532 61,183
(1,598,672) (2,784,841) (150,607)
Total Debt 125,700 366,416 21,238
(449,995) (763,709) (54,902)
Short term debt 9,229 21,486 4,069
(38,199) (66,196) (12,386)
Revenues 362,774 1,035,020 69,259
(2,380,223) (4,247,221) (194,381)
Gross Pro¯ts 87,433 249,652 20,097
(411,545) (735,018) (41,457)
Operating Cash °ow 28,024 89,382 1,853
(244,262) (440,098) (29,085)
Working Capital 43,187 127,270 7,322
(235,659) (417,890) (31,666)
Cash 21,231 55,051 6,485
(98,193) (173,551) (9,706)
Shareholders Equity 84,345 260,813 8,124
(646,382) (1,158,361) (61,728)
IPO Proceeds 154,942 356,018 67,683
(417,378) (708,500) (91,602)
Firm Age 7.72 8.79 7.26
(years between inception and IPO date) (11.08) (13.36) (9.92)
Fraction of the Firm Sold 27.55 34.74 24.53
by Shareholders (percent) (30.87) (53.17) (12.03)
Underpricing (percent) 45.13 25.34 53.77
(77.08) (42.18) (86.77)
No. Observations 306 93 213
Percent of Sample 100.0 30.4 69.626
Table 2: Wealth Relatives. For each IPO underwritten by the ¯rm's pre-IPO relationship bank,
we identify a matching ¯rm that is brought to the market by an independent bank. When a
stock in the matching sample is delisted, we splice its returns with the returns on a substitute
matching stock. We compute the average buy-and-hold return across the stocks underwritten
by relationship banks, RT;S, and the average return on stocks in the matching sample, RT;M.
The wealth relative is the ratio (1+RT;S)=(1+RT;M). In columns 1-6, the matching criteria are
the IPO date and the book-to-market value of equity. In columns 7-12, they are the IPO date
and the market value of equity on the fourteenth trading day. The holding period T ranges
from one to three years.
IPO Date and BE/ME matching criteria IPO Date and ME matching criteria
Equal-weighted return Value-weighted return Equal-weighted return Value-weighted return
1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
1.24 0.82 0.76 1.11 1.39 1.04 1.15 1.18 1.54 1.03 1.37 2.0227






where Ri;T and RPi;T are buy-and-hold returns on stock i (exclusive of the ¯rst trading day
return) and the benchmark portfolio Pi, respectively. The holding period T ranges from one to
three years. Where available, we include the ¯rm's delisting return. The benchmarks are the
return on 100 portfolios of stocks ranked by size and book-to-market (FF); the return on the
CRSP value-weighted index inclusive of distributions (VW); the S&P 500 cum-dividend return
(S&P 500); the Nasdaq cum-dividend return (Nasdaq); and the return on 49 industry-ranked
portfolios (Ind.). In column (S) we report mean (equal- and value-weighted) buy-and-hold
abnormal returns for the sample of IPOs underwritten by the ¯rm's pre-IPO relationship bank.
For each IPO underwritten by the ¯rm's pre-IPO relationship bank, we identify a matching
¯rm that is brought to the market by an independent bank. The matching criteria are the
IPO date and the book-to-market value of equity. When a stock in the matching sample is
delisted, we splice its returns with the returns on a substitute matching stock. In column
(M) we report (equal- and value-weighted) buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the IPOs in the
matching sample. The di®erence between mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns for IPOs in
the sample and in the matching group is in column (S-M). In Panels E-H we report results for
1998, 1999, and 2000 IPO years. Skewness-robust t-ratios are in square brackets. Signi¯cance
levels are determined based on bootstrapped critical values. ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate statistical
signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.28
T = 1Y T = 2Y T = 3Y
S M S-M S M S-M S M S-M
Table 3, Panel A: equal-weighted mean abnormal returns
FF 0.12 -0.06 0.18 -0.04 0.09 -0.12 0.00 0.10 -0.09
[ 0.81] [-0.37] [ 1.05] [-0.39] [ 0.64] [-0.75] [ 0.19] [ 1.30] [-0.97]
VW 0.06 -0.16 0.22 -0.05 0.06 -0.10 -0.05 0.03 -0.08
[ 0.43] [-0.85] [ 1.22] [-0.49] [ 0.45] [-0.64] [-0.79] [ 0.41] [-0.87]
S&P 500 0.05 -0.17 0.22 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 -0.05 0.03 -0.08
[ 0.35] [-0.91] [ 1.22] [-0.48] [ 0.46] [-0.64] [-0.81] [ 0.40] [-0.87]
Nasdaq -0.01 -0.22 0.22 -0.12 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 -0.08
[ 0.07] [-1.22] [ 1.22] [-1.25] [ 0.05] [-0.64] [-0.12] [ 0.97] [-0.87]
Ind. 0.15 -0.13 0.29 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -0.00 0.04 -0.05
[ 1.08] [-0.81] [ 1.74] [ 0.45] [ 0.66] [-0.41] [ 0.02] [ 0.64] [-0.53]
Table 3, Panel B: value-weighted mean abnormal returns
FF -0.30 -0.17 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04
[-2.40]¤¤¤ [-0.49] [-0.47] [-1.49] [-1.13] [-0.00] [-1.40] [-0.06] [-0.61]
VW -0.24 -0.25 0.00 -0.11 -0.16 0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01
[-2.47]¤¤¤ [-0.59] [-0.10] [-1.41] [-1.75] [ 0.48] [-1.83]¤ [-0.68] [-0.18]
S&P 500 -0.24 -0.26 0.02 -0.11 -0.17 0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01
[-2.49]¤¤¤ [-0.61] [-0.05] [-1.41] [-1.77] [ 0.50] [-1.79] [-0.67] [-0.18]
Nasdaq -0.32 -0.16 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
[-2.51]¤¤¤ [-0.41] [-0.59] [-0.99] [-1.16] [ 0.28] [-0.22] [ 0.20] [-0.29]
Ind. -0.10 -0.21 0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.02
[-1.22] [-0.56] [ 0.25] [-0.56] [-1.45] [ 0.87] [-0.40] [-0.31] [ 0.13]
Table 3, Panel C: equal-weighted mean abnormal returns, FF benchmark
1998 -0.05 0.11 -0.16 -0.13 0.29 -0.42 0.02 0.30 -0.28
[-0.24] [ 0.82] [-0.83] [-0.50] [ 0.81] [-0.99] [ 0.29] [ 1.61]¤ [-1.17]
1999 0.33 -0.37 0.69 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01
[ 0.72] [-0.78] [ 2.05]¤¤ [-0.72] [-0.24] [-0.09] [-0.88] [-0.46] [-0.07]
2000 0.17 -0.19 0.36 0.13 -0.07 0.19 0.05 -0.04 0.09
[ 1.61]¤ [-1.43] [ 1.89] [ 1.84]¤ [-0.88] [ 1.85] [ 1.23] [-0.86] [ 1.52]
Table 3, Panel D: value-weighted mean abnormal returns, FF benchmark
1998 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.13 0.34 -0.21 0.09 0.60 -0.51
[ 0.84] [ 0.60] [-0.06] [ 0.65] [ 0.95] [-0.46] [ 0.98] [ 1.39] [-1.10]
1999 -0.56 -0.61 0.05 -0.20 -0.27 0.07 -0.11 -0.14 0.03
[-2.82]¤¤¤ [-1.93]¤¤ [ 0.18] [-2.57]¤¤¤ [-1.95]¤¤ [ 0.58] [-2.06]¤¤ [-1.87]¤¤ [ 0.40]
2000 0.04 -0.37 0.41 -0.00 -0.14 0.14 -0.01 -0.09 0.08
[ 0.35] [-3.68]¤¤¤ [ 2.24]¤¤ [-0.06] [-3.51]¤¤¤ [ 1.12] [-0.24] [-2.26]¤¤ [ 1.06]29
Table 4: Skewness and Kurtosis of the Buy-and-Hold Benchmark-Adjusted Returns. We report
sample skewness and kurtosis for the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns. Here, the
benchmark is the return on 100 portfolios of stocks ranked by size and book-to-market deciles.



















1Y 4.09 -0.71 30.98 3.62
2Y 7.82 -0.45 88.87 2.94
3Y 7.34 -0.44 81.82 2.51
































































Figure 1: The Sample Distribution of the Buy-and-Hold Benchmark-Adjusted Returns. Buy-
and-hold returns are computed by compounding daily returns from the day of the IPO (exclusive
of the ¯rst trading day return) to the end of the holding period T, which ranges from one to
three years. Where available, we include the ¯rm's delisting return. In the left panels, the




T , where RPi;T is the buy-and-
hold benchmark portfolio return. Here, the benchmark is the return on 100 portfolios of stocks
ranked by size and book-to-market deciles. In the right panels, the buy-and-hold abnormal






Table 5: Mean Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns: Nonzero Cross-Sectional Correlation. The







where Ri;T and RPi;T are buy-and-hold returns on stock i (exclusive of the ¯rst trading day
return) and the benchmark portfolio Pi, respectively. The holding period T ranges from one to
three years. Where available, we include the ¯rm's delisting return. The benchmarks are the
return on 100 portfolios of stocks ranked by size and book-to-market (FF); the return on the
CRSP value-weighted index inclusive of distributions (VW); the S&P 500 cum-dividend return
(S&P 500); the Nasdaq cum-dividend return (Nasdaq); and the return on 49 industry-ranked
portfolios (Ind.). To deal with the heteroskedasticity and the cross-sectional dependence of






= ¯0 + ¯Certify Certifyi + "i :
The variance-covariance matrix of the error term is consistently estimated using high-frequency,
daily returns. If the returns on stocks i and j overlap for less than three months, we ¯x their
covariance at zero. The mean abnormal return for IPOs underwritten by the ¯rm's bank
is estimated by ^ ¯0 + ^ ¯Certify (columns 1, 4, and 7). The mean abnormal return for IPOs
underwritten by outside banks is estimated by ^ ¯0 (columns 2, 5, and 8). The di®erence between
the two means is estimated by ^ ¯Certify (columns 3, 6, and 9). In square brackets are t-ratios.
¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.31
T = 1Y T = 2Y T = 3Y
^ ¯0 + ^ ¯Cert: ^ ¯0 ^ ¯Cert: ^ ¯0 + ^ ¯Cert: ^ ¯0 ^ ¯Cert: ^ ¯0 + ^ ¯Cert: ^ ¯0 ^ ¯Cert:
Table 5, Panel A: Mean abnormal returns for all IPOs from 1998 to 2000.
FF 0.03 -0.15 0.18 -0.05 -0.16 0.11 -0.02 -0.13 0.10
[ 0.32] [-2.06]¤¤ [ 1.98]¤¤ [-0.48] [-1.56] [ 0.89] [-0.20] [-1.12] [ 0.74]
VW -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.25 -0.17
[-0.44] [-0.51] [ 0.09] [ 0.51] [ 0.61] [-0.17] [ 0.69] [ 1.83]¤ [-1.15]
S&P 500 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.00 0.12 0.28 -0.16
[ 0.68] [ 0.06] [ 0.64] [ 0.64] [ 0.58] [-0.03] [ 0.94] [ 1.87]¤ [-1.05]
Nasdaq -0.34 0.05 -0.39 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.12 0.25 -0.13
[-2.90]¤¤¤ [ 0.44] [-4.69]¤¤¤ [ 1.21] [ 1.07] [ 0.09] [ 0.84] [ 1.70]¤ [-0.91]
Ind. 0.02 -0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.20 -0.12
[ 0.20] [-1.11] [ 1.15] [-0.14] [ 0.44] [-0.50] [ 0.67] [ 1.57] [-0.87]
Table 5, Panel B: Mean abnormal returns by IPO year, FF benchmark
1998 0.15 0.01 0.14 -0.04 -0.13 0.10 0.04 -0.09 0.13
[ 1.43] [ 0.08] [ 1.13] [-0.20] [-0.97] [ 0.50] [ 0.19] [-0.60] [ 0.57]
1999 -0.13 -0.43 0.30 -0.18 -0.33 0.15 -0.16 -0.28 0.12
[-0.81] [-3.27]¤¤¤ [ 1.70]¤ [-0.87] [-1.88]¤ [ 0.68] [-0.70] [-1.51] [ 0.48]
2000 0.11 -0.16 0.27 -0.03 -0.20 0.17 -0.10 -0.18 0.08
[ 0.89] [-0.88] [ 1.40] [-0.18] [-0.76] [ 0.57] [-0.48] [-0.62] [ 0.25]32
Table 6: Long-Run Portfolio Returns: A Calendar-Time Analysis. For each IPO underwritten
by the ¯rm's pre-IPO relationship bank, we identify a matching ¯rm that is brought to the
market by an independent bank. In Panels A and B the matching criteria are the IPO date
and the book-to-market value of equity, while in Panels C and D they are the IPO date and
the market value of equity. The sample portfolio consists of stocks underwritten by the ¯rm's
relationship bank. The matching stocks managed by independent institutions are included in
the matching portfolio. We add a pair of stocks to the sample and matching portfolios starting
from the ¯rst week when both the stock issued by the relationship bank and its match are
¯rst listed. When a stock in the matching sample is delisted, we splice its returns with the
returns on a substitute matching stock. Where available, we include the ¯rm's delisting return.
The stock in the sample portfolio and its corresponding match in the matching portfolio are
held for a period that ranges from one to three years. In all panels, the dependent variable in
Columns 1-3 and 4-6 is the weekly return on the sample and matching portfolios, respectively.
The dependent variable in Columns 7-9 is the return on a portfolio that is long the sample
stocks and is short the matching stocks. In Panels A and C portfolio returns are equally
weighted, while in Panels B and D they are value weighted. The independent variables are
MKTt = rM;t ¡ rF;t, the weekly excess return on the market portfolio; SMBt, the di®erence
between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks;
HMLt, the di®erence between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks; and UMDt, the return on a `momentum'
portfolio. Returns are measured in yearly decimal units. Standard errors are in parentheses.
¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.33
rSample;t ¡ rF;t rMatch;t ¡ rF;t rSample;t ¡ rMatch;t
1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Table 6, Panel A: IPO Date and BE/ME matching criteria; equal-weighted portfolio returns
®
0.33¤¤ 0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.35¤¤ 0.10 -0.09
[ 2.37] [ 0.88] [ 0.24] [-0.11] [-0.04] [ 0.96] [ 2.03] [ 0.84] [-0.90]
MKTt
1.18¤¤¤ 1.01¤¤¤ 1.10¤¤¤ 0.94¤¤¤ 0.83¤¤¤ 1.01¤¤¤ 0.24 0.18 0.09
[ 7.21] [ 8.06] [ 9.93] [ 5.13] [ 4.95] [ 11.27] [ 1.31] [ 1.17] [ 0.73]
SMBt
1.11¤¤¤ 1.15¤¤¤ 1.20¤¤¤ 1.28¤¤¤ 1.18¤¤¤ 1.34¤¤¤ -0.17 -0.04 -0.14
[ 5.00] [ 8.94] [ 9.50] [ 7.73] [ 7.83] [ 11.65] [-0.82] [-0.21] [-0.87]
HMLt
-0.52¤¤ -0.33¤¤ -0.04 -0.77¤¤¤ -0.77¤¤¤ -0.31¤¤ 0.25 0.43¤¤ 0.27
[-2.20] [-2.45] [-0.28] [-2.72] [-3.91] [-2.41] [ 0.83] [ 2.07] [ 1.52]
UMDt
-0.55¤¤¤ -0.61¤¤¤ -0.59¤¤¤ -0.45¤¤¤ -0.53¤¤¤ -0.54¤¤¤ -0.10 -0.08 -0.05
[-4.63] [-6.63] [-7.82] [-4.14] [-4.76] [-6.08] [-0.96] [-0.91] [-0.59]
R2
Adj: 68.92% 65.29% 62.73% 62.42% 61.69% 69.20% 0.72% 1.53% 0.87%
Table 6, Panel B: IPO Date and BE/ME matching criteria; value-weighted portfolio returns
®
0.22 0.00 0.01 -0.16 -0.01 -0.00 0.39¤ 0.01 0.01
[ 1.27] [ 0.01] [ 0.06] [-0.67] [-0.05] [-0.02] [ 1.66] [ 0.06] [ 0.07]
MKTt
1.24¤¤¤ 0.92¤¤¤ 1.02¤¤¤ 1.00¤¤¤ 0.77¤¤¤ 1.19¤¤¤ 0.24 0.15 -0.17
[ 5.59] [ 5.55] [ 6.13] [ 3.44] [ 3.56] [ 7.32] [ 0.89] [ 0.79] [-0.97]
SMBt
1.14¤¤¤ 1.09¤¤¤ 1.11¤¤¤ 1.31¤¤¤ 1.32¤¤¤ 1.37¤¤¤ -0.17 -0.22 -0.27
[ 3.76] [ 6.00] [ 7.39] [ 4.19] [ 5.52] [ 6.31] [-0.49] [-0.76] [-1.10]
HMLt
-0.61¤¤ -0.47¤¤¤ -0.31 -1.13¤¤¤ -1.42¤¤¤ -0.92¤¤¤ 0.53 0.95¤¤¤ 0.61¤¤¤
[-2.15] [-2.63] [-1.40] [-2.58] [-5.44] [-4.91] [ 1.26] [ 3.66] [ 3.12]
UMDt
-0.58¤¤¤ -0.67¤¤¤ -0.68¤¤¤ -0.44¤¤ -0.65¤¤¤ -0.78¤¤¤ -0.15 -0.01 0.10
[-3.54] [-5.26] [-5.66] [-2.02] [-4.00] [-6.18] [-0.85] [-0.08] [ 0.64]
R2
Adj: 63.68% 52.98% 62.95% 52.11% 56.85% 63.29% 1.40% 8.07% 8.29%34
rSample;t ¡ rF;t rMatch;t ¡ rF;t rSample;t ¡ rMatch;t
1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y 1Y 2Y 3Y
Table 6, Panel C: IPO Date and ME matching criteria; equal-weighted portfolio returns
®
0.19¤ 0.07 0.04 0.29¤ 0.21 0.26¤¤ -0.10 -0.14 -0.21¤
[ 1.84] [ 0.72] [ 0.55] [ 1.73] [ 1.56] [ 2.23] [-0.68] [-1.13] [-1.92]
MKTt
1.30¤¤¤ 1.20¤¤¤ 1.14¤¤¤ 1.28¤¤¤ 1.19¤¤¤ 1.29¤¤¤ 0.03 0.02 -0.14
[ 12.10] [ 12.14] [ 11.20] [ 7.33] [ 9.56] [ 12.14] [ 0.16] [ 0.14] [-1.26]
SMBt
1.20¤¤¤ 1.14¤¤¤ 1.14¤¤¤ 1.26¤¤¤ 1.35¤¤¤ 1.47¤¤¤ -0.06 -0.21 -0.34¤¤
[ 7.08] [ 8.57] [ 9.52] [ 6.82] [ 8.37] [ 10.99] [-0.42] [-1.44] [-2.46]
HMLt
-0.05 -0.03 0.04 -1.05¤¤¤ -1.00¤¤¤ -0.58¤¤¤ 1.00¤¤¤ 0.97¤¤¤ 0.63¤¤¤
[-0.34] [-0.23] [ 0.35] [-4.37] [-5.97] [-3.63] [ 4.70] [ 5.93] [ 3.88]
UMDt
-0.46¤¤¤ -0.56¤¤¤ -0.57¤¤¤ -0.36¤¤¤ -0.54¤¤¤ -0.53¤¤¤ -0.10 -0.02 -0.04
[-4.60] [-7.09] [-7.57] [-2.74] [-5.03] [-5.68] [-1.10] [-0.24] [-0.46]
R2
Adj: 72.26% 72.70% 68.27% 72.24% 72.67% 75.55% 21.15% 21.53% 16.47%
Table 6, Panel D: IPO Date and ME matching criteria; value-weighted portfolio returns
®
0.12 0.03 0.06 0.37¤¤ 0.28¤ 0.24¤ -0.25 -0.26 -0.18
[ 0.79] [ 0.20] [ 0.58] [ 2.06] [ 1.83] [ 1.66] [-1.25] [-1.62] [-1.34]
MKTt
1.35¤¤¤ 1.13¤¤¤ 1.11¤¤¤ 1.49¤¤¤ 1.38¤¤¤ 1.58¤¤¤ -0.14 -0.25 -0.46¤¤¤
[ 6.53] [ 7.53] [ 6.85] [ 5.56] [ 6.87] [ 9.07] [-0.48] [-1.24] [-2.81]
SMBt
1.26¤¤¤ 1.14¤¤¤ 1.09¤¤¤ 1.26¤¤¤ 1.38¤¤¤ 1.52¤¤¤ -0.01 -0.24 -0.43¤¤
[ 4.93] [ 6.81] [ 7.48] [ 5.90] [ 7.48] [ 7.53] [-0.02] [-1.30] [-2.42]
HMLt
-0.18 -0.15 -0.16 -1.13¤¤¤ -1.27¤¤¤ -0.92¤¤¤ 0.95¤¤ 1.12¤¤¤ 0.76¤¤¤
[-0.76] [-0.88] [-0.77] [-2.94] [-4.73] [-3.53] [ 2.38] [ 4.05] [ 3.29]
UMDt
-0.56¤¤¤ -0.67¤¤¤ -0.68¤¤¤ -0.18 -0.65¤¤¤ -0.74¤¤¤ -0.39¤¤¤ -0.02 0.06
[-3.59] [-6.23] [-6.08] [-1.28] [-4.20] [-5.06] [-2.70] [-0.13] [ 0.36]
R2
Adj: 64.38% 61.47% 65.49% 64.14% 66.88% 69.84% 14.39% 22.46% 21.36%35
Table 7: Do ¯rms self select into the Certify=1 and Certify=0 categories? The results reported
in this table correspond to the second step of the Heckman two-step estimation procedure to



















where ^ ° is the ¯rst-step probit estimate of the selection model Certifyi =
(
1 i® Wi = Zi° + ´i ¸ 0;
0 i® Wi = Zi° + ´i < 0:
Each regression includes a categorical variable for the IPO year and a constant. Bootstrapped
standard errors, reported in parentheses, correct for the fact that in the estimation of this
regression model we ¯x ° at the ¯rst-stage probit estimate ^ ° (we estimate ^ ° and ^ ¯ for 1,000
resamples with replacement, each of the size of the original data set, and compute bootstrapped
standard errors as in Greene (2003), page 924). ¤¤¤, ¤¤, and ¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Size 1 Firm Size 2 Cash °ows Internet Stock
¼ 0.29¤¤ 0.22¤¤ 0.27¤¤ 0.25¤
(0.141) (0.130) (0.133) (0.131)
Log(Assets) 1.69¤¤¤ 2.01¤¤¤ 1.66¤¤¤
(0.410) (0.512) (0.412)






0.93¤¤¤ 1.43¤¤¤ 1.42¤¤¤ 1.41¤¤¤
(0.217) (0.122) (0.121) (0.124)
Log
³
Shares O®ered in IPO
Total Shares Outstanding after IPO
´
-1.34¤¤¤ -1.22¤¤¤ -1.14¤¤¤ -1.14¤¤¤







Internet Stock Categorical Variable 0.42
(0.219)
IPO Year Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Flexible form for ¯rm size Yes No No No
Observations 298 298 293 298
R-squared 52% 55% 56% 55%1 
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